Recently, the FCC issued an order requiring China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom to resolve their certification issues within the U.S. Robocall Mitigation Database (RMD) within 14 days. The order also demands that the three Chinese carriers demonstrate they pose no threat to U.S. national security and are in the public interest to remain listed in the database.

The FCC warned that failure to respond adequately would result in the removal of these Chinese operators from the RMD, causing U.S. carriers to stop accepting direct calls from them. According to foreign media reports, this would effectively block Chinese carriers from accessing the U.S. telecommunications network—meaning voice calls originating in China and routed through Chinese carriers to the United States would be blocked. Clearly, this would severely disrupt normal communication between users in both countries.

Combating robocalls is a shared responsibility for telecom operators and regulators in both China and the United States. Differences in technical approaches and regulatory frameworks are natural and can—and should—be resolved through dialogue and negotiation. However, the U.S. approach of demanding Chinese carriers comply with its certification rules while simultaneously forcing them to “prove their innocence” on national security grounds fundamentally amounts to the securitization of what should be a technical anti-robocall issue. Regardless of whether Chinese carriers meet the certification requirements, the FCC retains the discretion to remove them from the database under the guise of national security, thereby severing their direct connection to the U.S. voice network and further advancing the decoupling of U.S.-China telecommunications infrastructure and technology ties.

In recent years, the FCC has repeatedly invoked national security as a pretext to insert itself aggressively into U.S.-China relations, acting as a vanguard in America’s campaign to contain and suppress Chinese tech and drive technological decoupling. Between 2019 and 2022, the FCC denied China Mobile’s application to operate in the U.S. and revoked the operating licenses of China Unicom and China Telecom, citing security risks. In 2020, it placed Huawei and ZTE on its “national security threat” list, banning their equipment from the U.S. market. In 2022, the FCC again cited security concerns to prohibit the sale of products from five Chinese companies—including Huawei, ZTE, and Hikvision—in the United States.

This year, the FCC has intensified its actions against China. In March, it established a “National Security Committee” explicitly aimed at countering challenges posed by China and announced comprehensive investigations into nine Chinese telecom and technology firms. In May, it introduced new rules barring Chinese laboratories deemed a national security risk from testing electronic devices destined for the U.S. market, and in September, it blacklisted 11 such labs. In October, the FCC forced e-commerce platforms to remove millions of Chinese-made electronic products, falsely alleging security risks, and announced plans to ban Hong Kong Telecom from operating in the U.S.

Whether it was Edward Snowden’s exposure of the U.S.’s global surveillance “PRISM” program or media revelations that the CIA controlled a Swiss encryption company to spy on over 100 countries, the evidence consistently shows that the United States—not China—is the greatest threat to global telecommunications security. The FCC’s baseless claims that Chinese telecom companies and products endanger U.S. national security, followed by arbitrary restrictions, sanctions, and bans, exemplify the classic tactics of “projecting one’s own faults onto others” and “the thief crying ‘stop thief!’”

The FCC’s bans on Chinese telecom equipment and consumer electronics have significantly increased operational costs for U.S. telecom networks and raised living expenses for American consumers. Its blacklisting of Chinese testing labs has severely disrupted global electronics supply chains, with the added testing and procurement costs ultimately borne by U.S. citizens. If the FCC proceeds to block Chinese carriers from connecting directly to the U.S. voice network, it will inevitably disrupt normal communications between Chinese and American users—causing daily inconvenience for people in both countries and undermining exchanges and cooperation in cultural, economic, and other fields.

In today’s deeply interconnected world, where the digital economy is thriving, interconnectivity among national telecom networks and technologies is an irreversible global trend. We urge the FCC to abandon its obsession with weaponizing national security, return to its core mandate as a professional regulator, and contribute to the advancement of telecom technology and industry in the U.S. and globally—rather than acting as a roadblock to international telecom cooperation.

Recently, the FCC issued an order requiring China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom to resolve their certification issues within the U.S. Robocall Mitigation Database (RMD) within 14 days. The order also demands that the three Chinese carriers demonstrate they pose no threat to U.S. national security and are in the public interest to remain listed in the database.

The FCC warned that failure to respond adequately would result in the removal of these Chinese operators from the RMD, causing U.S. carriers to stop accepting direct calls from them. According to foreign media reports, this would effectively block Chinese carriers from accessing the U.S. telecommunications network—meaning voice calls originating in China and routed through Chinese carriers to the United States would be blocked. Clearly, this would severely disrupt normal communication between users in both countries.

Combating robocalls is a shared responsibility for telecom operators and regulators in both China and the United States. Differences in technical approaches and regulatory frameworks are natural and can—and should—be resolved through dialogue and negotiation. However, the U.S. approach of demanding Chinese carriers comply with its certification rules while simultaneously forcing them to “prove their innocence” on national security grounds fundamentally amounts to the securitization of what should be a technical anti-robocall issue. Regardless of whether Chinese carriers meet the certification requirements, the FCC retains the discretion to remove them from the database under the guise of national security, thereby severing their direct connection to the U.S. voice network and further advancing the decoupling of U.S.-China telecommunications infrastructure and technology ties.

In recent years, the FCC has repeatedly invoked national security as a pretext to insert itself aggressively into U.S.-China relations, acting as a vanguard in America’s campaign to contain and suppress Chinese tech and drive technological decoupling. Between 2019 and 2022, the FCC denied China Mobile’s application to operate in the U.S. and revoked the operating licenses of China Unicom and China Telecom, citing security risks. In 2020, it placed Huawei and ZTE on its “national security threat” list, banning their equipment from the U.S. market. In 2022, the FCC again cited security concerns to prohibit the sale of products from five Chinese companies—including Huawei, ZTE, and Hikvision—in the United States.

This year, the FCC has intensified its actions against China. In March, it established a “National Security Committee” explicitly aimed at countering challenges posed by China and announced comprehensive investigations into nine Chinese telecom and technology firms. In May, it introduced new rules barring Chinese laboratories deemed a national security risk from testing electronic devices destined for the U.S. market, and in September, it blacklisted 11 such labs. In October, the FCC forced e-commerce platforms to remove millions of Chinese-made electronic products, falsely alleging security risks, and announced plans to ban Hong Kong Telecom from operating in the U.S.

Whether it was Edward Snowden’s exposure of the U.S.’s global surveillance “PRISM” program or media revelations that the CIA controlled a Swiss encryption company to spy on over 100 countries, the evidence consistently shows that the United States—not China—is the greatest threat to global telecommunications security. The FCC’s baseless claims that Chinese telecom companies and products endanger U.S. national security, followed by arbitrary restrictions, sanctions, and bans, exemplify the classic tactics of “projecting one’s own faults onto others” and “the thief crying ‘stop thief!’”

The FCC’s bans on Chinese telecom equipment and consumer electronics have significantly increased operational costs for U.S. telecom networks and raised living expenses for American consumers. Its blacklisting of Chinese testing labs has severely disrupted global electronics supply chains, with the added testing and procurement costs ultimately borne by U.S. citizens. If the FCC proceeds to block Chinese carriers from connecting directly to the U.S. voice network, it will inevitably disrupt normal communications between Chinese and American users—causing daily inconvenience for people in both countries and undermining exchanges and cooperation in cultural, economic, and other fields.

In today’s deeply interconnected world, where the digital economy is thriving, interconnectivity among national telecom networks and technologies is an irreversible global trend. We urge the FCC to abandon its obsession with weaponizing national security, return to its core mandate as a professional regulator, and contribute to the advancement of telecom technology and industry in the U.S. and globally—rather than acting as a roadblock to international telecom cooperation.