As U.S.-Taiwan tariff negotiations draw to a close, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo stated in an interview in early December that Taiwan has committed to training American workers, with the ultimate goal of shifting supply chains to the United States. The photo shows students wearing white protective suits and masks visiting a clean room in Hsinchu, Taiwan on July 18, 2025. This was part of a summer camp organized by U.S. chip design firm Synopsys, aimed at attracting more young people to join Taiwan's semiconductor industry.

The U.S. new National Security Strategy (NSS) explicitly identifies Taiwan as a global leader in semiconductors—a rare explicit reference—highlighting Taiwan’s pivotal position in the world’s advanced chip manufacturing processes and integrated supply chains. However, as cross-Strait tensions continue to escalate, the vulnerability arising from the high concentration of semiconductor manufacturing in Taiwan has prompted the United States to demand that Taiwan assist in training its workforce, thereby facilitating the reshoring of semiconductor supply chains to the U.S. mainland.

The White House published the 2025 National Security Strategy on its official website last Friday (December 5). For the first time, this top-tier national strategic document formally affirmed that Taiwan’s dominant status in the global semiconductor industry is critical to U.S. interests.

Many observers argue that this narrative reflects the Trump administration’s business-centric strategic thinking.

In an article interpreting the new National Security Strategy, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a U.S. think tank, pointed out that the document devotes "far more attention to Taiwan than ever before." Yet by directly linking Taiwan’s significance to its dominance in global semiconductor production and its key geographical location, it has to a certain extent "instrumentalized" Taiwan.

The New York Times also criticized in an editorial that Taiwan is reduced to a matter of "semiconductor and trade route interests" in the National Security Strategy, with no mention of its status as a core democratic value cherished by the United States.

These criticisms indeed reflect that for the highly mercantilist Trump administration, Taiwan’s position in semiconductor manufacturing is the primary U.S. concern.

After the third quarter of this year, the global wafer foundry industry has rapidly moved toward concentration, with Taiwan maintaining its leading market share.

According to data from the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) of Taiwan, in terms of advanced process layout, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) holds an absolute advantage in the 2nm, 3nm, and 4nm–6nm nodes, with market shares of 53%, 69%, and approximately 85% respectively. This dominance is underpinned by Taiwan’s comprehensive semiconductor ecosystem.

ITRI also projects that by 2029, 61% of the world’s 2nm–6nm chip manufacturing capacity will be located in Taiwan, compared to only 16% in the United States. While the U.S. is bolstering its capacity through investments by Intel and TSMC’s Arizona facilities, Taiwan retains advantages in technological density, talent pool, and industrial clustering, continuing to consolidate its core position in the global tech supply chain.

Nevertheless, just three days after the release of the new National Security Strategy, U.S. President Donald Trump claimed on Monday (December 8) that the chip industry is shifting from Taiwan to the United States, and that the U.S. will soon reclaim 40% to 50% of the global chip market.

Furthermore, as U.S.-Taiwan tariff negotiations near completion, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo said in an early December interview that Taiwan has pledged to train American workers. "The ultimate goal is to move the supply chains to the United States—to produce semiconductors and pharmaceuticals here, to train Americans for these jobs, and to keep the entire supply chain in the U.S. That is our entire purpose."

Against this backdrop, how will the U.S. new National Security Strategy impact U.S.-Taiwan tech and security interactions, and what implications will it have for Taiwan’s semiconductor layout? In an interview with Lianhe Zaobao, Wu Ling-hsiang, Executive Director of Taiwan Tech Force, analyzed that Taiwan remains in a subordinate position, with its fundamental strategy still being to "lean unilaterally" toward the United States.

Wu holds a Master’s degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering from the University of Michigan and a PhD in Political Science from National Taiwan University. He is one of the few experts in Taiwan who conducts cross-disciplinary research spanning high technology and geopolitics.

He argues that the U.S. military currently has a massive demand for advanced chips. And until the U.S. establishes sufficient domestic mass production capacity—for instance, Intel’s 18A process still lacks adequate mass production capability and yield rates, while TSMC’s Arizona Phase 1 facility can only produce 4nm chips (equivalent to an advanced version of 5nm)—the U.S. will have to rely on Taiwan to continue supplying advanced chips to its military-industrial complex and artificial intelligence (AI) industry, particularly the numerous data centers under construction.

However, Wu asserted that this is merely a "short-term stopgap measure" for the United States. The long-term U.S. strategic objective remains to bring advanced manufacturing capabilities back to its mainland.

In an interview, Wang Kuo-chen, Assistant Research Fellow at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER)—a think tank with official ties in Taiwan—pointed out that the U.S. drive to build resilient domestic supply chains is understandable, especially the need for backup capacity in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.

But he emphasized that it is "impossible in the short term, and the proportion will not be very high" for the U.S. to relocate all semiconductor production capacity back home, as global supply chains inherently rely on division of labor. Additionally, America’s labor culture poses the biggest challenge. "Even if Taiwan is willing to assist in training American workers, the success rate will not be very high."

Shortly after the White House released the National Security Strategy, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the compromise version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on Wednesday (December 10). The bill includes provisions for establishing a U.S.-Taiwan joint program on unmanned systems.

Under the terms of the bill, the U.S. Secretary of the Army must seek to launch a joint program with Taiwan on unmanned systems and counter-unmanned systems capabilities by March 1, 2026. This includes the joint development and production of such systems for use by U.S. and Taiwanese military forces, and must comply with the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act.

Beyond the United States, Europe has also recently stepped up cooperation with Taiwan in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

According to observations by Taiwan’s Science and Technology, Democracy and Society Research Center (a government-affiliated think tank), Taiwan’s UAV exports to Europe surged in the first half of this year. As of July, export volume exceeded 26,000 units, seven times the figure for the same period last year. Poland accounted for approximately 60% of these exports, making it the primary buyer.

Moreover, in September this year, Taiwan’s Asian UAV AI Innovation Application R&D Center, the Association of Manufacturers of the Asian UAV Innovation Park, TüV Rheinland, and STMicroelectronics formally signed a four-party memorandum of cooperation.

Wu Ling-hsiang argues that amid the trend of "military AI-ization"—whereby weapons become smarter and more autonomous, and military staff operations are increasingly automated—Taiwan’s role in this supply chain is not limited to the military sector. Instead, Taiwan serves as a provider of hardware infrastructure for the entire AI industry, including chips, printed circuit boards (PCBs), servers, thermal management systems, racks, rail systems, and power supplies.

He noted that Taiwan is indeed irreplaceable in these fields at present. Especially when supply chains require "non-China" components, Taiwanese manufacturers emerge as the world’s most competitive major suppliers.

However, Wang Kuo-chen cautioned that from an economic perspective, weapons become obsolete if unused for several years and do not form a sustainable industrial cycle. Furthermore, if Taiwan continues exporting high-end products to the United States, it will only widen the U.S.-Taiwan trade surplus, which is bound to give rise to bilateral frictions.

He argued that Taiwan should not focus solely on the chip industry forever. "This industry has been developing for 50 years. We should start thinking about the next industry."

U.S. Releases New National Security Strategy, Explicitly Identifying Taiwan's Foundational Role in Semiconductors  Analysis: Long-Term Strategy Remains Regaining Dominance in Chip Manufacturing

As U.S.-Taiwan tariff negotiations draw to a close, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo stated in an interview in early December that Taiwan has committed to training American workers, with the ultimate goal of shifting supply chains to the United States. The photo shows students wearing white protective suits and masks visiting a clean room in Hsinchu, Taiwan on July 18, 2025. This was part of a summer camp organized by U.S. chip design firm Synopsys, aimed at attracting more young people to join Taiwan's semiconductor industry.

The U.S. new National Security Strategy (NSS) explicitly identifies Taiwan as a global leader in semiconductors—a rare explicit reference—highlighting Taiwan’s pivotal position in the world’s advanced chip manufacturing processes and integrated supply chains. However, as cross-Strait tensions continue to escalate, the vulnerability arising from the high concentration of semiconductor manufacturing in Taiwan has prompted the United States to demand that Taiwan assist in training its workforce, thereby facilitating the reshoring of semiconductor supply chains to the U.S. mainland.

The White House published the 2025 National Security Strategy on its official website last Friday (December 5). For the first time, this top-tier national strategic document formally affirmed that Taiwan’s dominant status in the global semiconductor industry is critical to U.S. interests.

Many observers argue that this narrative reflects the Trump administration’s business-centric strategic thinking.

In an article interpreting the new National Security Strategy, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a U.S. think tank, pointed out that the document devotes "far more attention to Taiwan than ever before." Yet by directly linking Taiwan’s significance to its dominance in global semiconductor production and its key geographical location, it has to a certain extent "instrumentalized" Taiwan.

The New York Times also criticized in an editorial that Taiwan is reduced to a matter of "semiconductor and trade route interests" in the National Security Strategy, with no mention of its status as a core democratic value cherished by the United States.

These criticisms indeed reflect that for the highly mercantilist Trump administration, Taiwan’s position in semiconductor manufacturing is the primary U.S. concern.

After the third quarter of this year, the global wafer foundry industry has rapidly moved toward concentration, with Taiwan maintaining its leading market share.

According to data from the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) of Taiwan, in terms of advanced process layout, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) holds an absolute advantage in the 2nm, 3nm, and 4nm–6nm nodes, with market shares of 53%, 69%, and approximately 85% respectively. This dominance is underpinned by Taiwan’s comprehensive semiconductor ecosystem.

ITRI also projects that by 2029, 61% of the world’s 2nm–6nm chip manufacturing capacity will be located in Taiwan, compared to only 16% in the United States. While the U.S. is bolstering its capacity through investments by Intel and TSMC’s Arizona facilities, Taiwan retains advantages in technological density, talent pool, and industrial clustering, continuing to consolidate its core position in the global tech supply chain.

Nevertheless, just three days after the release of the new National Security Strategy, U.S. President Donald Trump claimed on Monday (December 8) that the chip industry is shifting from Taiwan to the United States, and that the U.S. will soon reclaim 40% to 50% of the global chip market.

Furthermore, as U.S.-Taiwan tariff negotiations near completion, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo said in an early December interview that Taiwan has pledged to train American workers. "The ultimate goal is to move the supply chains to the United States—to produce semiconductors and pharmaceuticals here, to train Americans for these jobs, and to keep the entire supply chain in the U.S. That is our entire purpose."

Against this backdrop, how will the U.S. new National Security Strategy impact U.S.-Taiwan tech and security interactions, and what implications will it have for Taiwan’s semiconductor layout? In an interview with Lianhe Zaobao, Wu Ling-hsiang, Executive Director of Taiwan Tech Force, analyzed that Taiwan remains in a subordinate position, with its fundamental strategy still being to "lean unilaterally" toward the United States.

Wu holds a Master’s degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering from the University of Michigan and a PhD in Political Science from National Taiwan University. He is one of the few experts in Taiwan who conducts cross-disciplinary research spanning high technology and geopolitics.

He argues that the U.S. military currently has a massive demand for advanced chips. And until the U.S. establishes sufficient domestic mass production capacity—for instance, Intel’s 18A process still lacks adequate mass production capability and yield rates, while TSMC’s Arizona Phase 1 facility can only produce 4nm chips (equivalent to an advanced version of 5nm)—the U.S. will have to rely on Taiwan to continue supplying advanced chips to its military-industrial complex and artificial intelligence (AI) industry, particularly the numerous data centers under construction.

However, Wu asserted that this is merely a "short-term stopgap measure" for the United States. The long-term U.S. strategic objective remains to bring advanced manufacturing capabilities back to its mainland.

In an interview, Wang Kuo-chen, Assistant Research Fellow at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER)—a think tank with official ties in Taiwan—pointed out that the U.S. drive to build resilient domestic supply chains is understandable, especially the need for backup capacity in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.

But he emphasized that it is "impossible in the short term, and the proportion will not be very high" for the U.S. to relocate all semiconductor production capacity back home, as global supply chains inherently rely on division of labor. Additionally, America’s labor culture poses the biggest challenge. "Even if Taiwan is willing to assist in training American workers, the success rate will not be very high."

Shortly after the White House released the National Security Strategy, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the compromise version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on Wednesday (December 10). The bill includes provisions for establishing a U.S.-Taiwan joint program on unmanned systems.

Under the terms of the bill, the U.S. Secretary of the Army must seek to launch a joint program with Taiwan on unmanned systems and counter-unmanned systems capabilities by March 1, 2026. This includes the joint development and production of such systems for use by U.S. and Taiwanese military forces, and must comply with the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act.

Beyond the United States, Europe has also recently stepped up cooperation with Taiwan in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

According to observations by Taiwan’s Science and Technology, Democracy and Society Research Center (a government-affiliated think tank), Taiwan’s UAV exports to Europe surged in the first half of this year. As of July, export volume exceeded 26,000 units, seven times the figure for the same period last year. Poland accounted for approximately 60% of these exports, making it the primary buyer.

Moreover, in September this year, Taiwan’s Asian UAV AI Innovation Application R&D Center, the Association of Manufacturers of the Asian UAV Innovation Park, TüV Rheinland, and STMicroelectronics formally signed a four-party memorandum of cooperation.

Wu Ling-hsiang argues that amid the trend of "military AI-ization"—whereby weapons become smarter and more autonomous, and military staff operations are increasingly automated—Taiwan’s role in this supply chain is not limited to the military sector. Instead, Taiwan serves as a provider of hardware infrastructure for the entire AI industry, including chips, printed circuit boards (PCBs), servers, thermal management systems, racks, rail systems, and power supplies.

He noted that Taiwan is indeed irreplaceable in these fields at present. Especially when supply chains require "non-China" components, Taiwanese manufacturers emerge as the world’s most competitive major suppliers.

However, Wang Kuo-chen cautioned that from an economic perspective, weapons become obsolete if unused for several years and do not form a sustainable industrial cycle. Furthermore, if Taiwan continues exporting high-end products to the United States, it will only widen the U.S.-Taiwan trade surplus, which is bound to give rise to bilateral frictions.

He argued that Taiwan should not focus solely on the chip industry forever. "This industry has been developing for 50 years. We should start thinking about the next industry."

U.S. Releases New National Security Strategy, Explicitly Identifying Taiwan's Foundational Role in Semiconductors  Analysis: Long-Term Strategy Remains Regaining Dominance in Chip Manufacturing