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Analyzing North Korea’s Policy Shifts: Balancing Rational Interests and Irrational Behavior
When exploring the motivations behind [a country’s actions], we must examine both the pros and cons, yet we cannot focus solely on interests—we must also not overlook the self-defeating, harmful behaviors people may engage in under irrational circumstances. On September 18, Kim Jong-un inspected and operated the "Venus" series of tactical unmanned combat aerial vehicles at an undisclosed location in North Korea, emphasizing the importance of using artificial intelligence-enabled drones.
During his attendance at the Supreme People’s Assembly on September 21, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared, "North Korea and South Korea are two separate countries and will never be unified as one." Over the previous two years, Kim Jong-un and North Korean officials had repeatedly emphasized that North Korea and South Korea are distinct countries and separate ethnic groups: they removed references to "unification" and "compatriots" from all sectors, demolished facilities such as the Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification, abolished institutions for inter-Korean exchanges, and even labeled South Korea as a "permanent main enemy."
These moves by North Korea have puzzled observers of the Korean Peninsula issue. For decades prior, North Korea had claimed that the area south of the 38th parallel was also part of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and that it would inevitably unify the peninsula. Whether North Korea opposed the South Korean government as a "puppet regime" or engaged with the South in a friendly manner, it always framed its actions around the premise of national unification. Today, however, North Korea claims the two sides are separate countries—and that neither the South Korean government nor its people are "compatriots" anymore. This represents a shocking reversal.
In response, many observers have struggled to analyze and explain this shift. Some argue Kim Jong-un is doing this to focus on domestic affairs or due to the harsh reality that inter-Korean unification is unachievable; others suggest it is a show of toughness by North Korea, or an act of self-preservation to appear weak.
While these views are not entirely groundless, they are not very convincing—and some even contradict each other. I hold several perspectives that differ from other observers.
First, North Korea’s successive leaders and its regime cannot be regarded as fully rational rulers. On the contrary, their words, actions, and policies are marked by strong subjective arbitrariness and extremism. If we view them through the lens of "normal state behavior" and analyze their decision-making motives purely through a rational framework, we will inevitably make misjudgments.
North Korea is a highly totalitarian system. Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un have all held a triple status: monarch of a de facto monarchy, religious figure, and head of a modern totalitarian state. They act with impunity domestically, with no one daring to oppose them. They have been tyrannical toward their subjects, with no mechanisms for criticism or checks—and this makes their handling of foreign affairs inevitably erratic.
In fact, compared to their arbitrary domestic actions—such as large-scale violent purges, deprivation of citizens’ basic freedoms, indifference to famine and corruption, and even the killing of close relatives and officials—the Kim dynasty’s foreign policies (including its approach to the South) have been relatively "restrained." Even so, whether to maintain regime stability, divert domestic tensions, or simply on a leader’s whim, North Korea has often taken shocking diplomatic actions that defy common sense.
For example, while the 1950 Korean War had complex backgrounds, Kim Il-sung’s personal subjective decisions played a major role in its outbreak. In the 1980s, when North Korea faced diplomatic difficulties, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il ordered the Yangon bombing and the Korean Air Flight 858 bombing—incidents that shocked the world. From the establishment of the regime until the end of the 20th century, North Korea also abducted citizens from Japan, South Korea, and other countries, with absurd justifications: abducting Japanese citizens to train North Korean spies in foreign languages, for instance, or abducting a South Korean director to make films for Kim Jong-il.
Of course, not all of the Kim dynasty’s extreme actions have been irrational. Some have involved sophisticated calculations and cunning tactics—calculated and ruthless. In the 1950s, for example, Kim Il-sung allied with China and the Soviet Union while boldly purging members of the Yan’an faction and Soviet faction within the Workers’ Party of Korea. He refused to yield to pressure from China and the Soviet Union to stop the purges, and correctly predicted that neither country would take drastic action against him. As it turned out, Kim Il-sung’s judgment was accurate: he eliminated his political opponents while continuing to receive aid from China and the Soviet Union, as well as recognition of his rule.
North Korea also frequently uses "brinksmanship"—violent provocation—to intimidate the U.S., South Korea, and other parties involved in the Korean Peninsula issue in order to gain benefits. It has shelled South Korean military positions multiple times on the west coast, causing casualties and creating an atmosphere of fear. It has also provoked the U.S. in incidents such as the "Panmunjom Axe Murder Incident." At the same time, it avoids escalating tensions to the point of all-out war: by creating a sense of crisis, it unites domestic public opinion, attracts international attention, and forces concessions from other parties—all without threatening its own rule. North Korea’s multiple nuclear tests also serve a similar purpose, and in fact, it has achieved some of its goals through these actions.
However, not all of North Korea’s unconventional, radical, and extreme moves are the result of careful planning. Many stem from childishness and foolishness driven by willfulness. For example, to attract foreign investment and increase fiscal revenue, North Korea cooperated with South Korea to develop the Kaesong Industrial Complex and opened Mount Kumgang to foreign tourists. Later, however, it backtracked: it forcibly shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex and expelled South Korean personnel. North Korean soldiers who shot and killed a South Korean tourist at Mount Kumgang were awarded, and the scenic area has since been closed. North Korea once blew up the Yongbyon nuclear facility to show its sincerity in abandoning nuclear weapons—only to rebuild it later. During the presidency of Moon Jae-in, when South Korea adopted a friendly policy toward the North, North Korea still took actions such as indefinitely suspending reunions of separated inter-Korean families and blowing up the Inter-Korean Liaison Office. From an interest-based perspective, all these incidents were “What one gains is less than what one loses”.
The Outbreak of Irrational Politics
North Korea’s sudden and intense promotion of the "two-Korea theory" over the past two years represents another outbreak of irrational politics. In this case, there is less calculation or utilitarian purpose—and more childish foolishness and willful arbitrariness.
North Korea’s abandonment of the unification narrative may be intended to sever ties with the South, thereby safeguarding the legitimacy and stability of its rule over the northern half of the peninsula. However, the cost is steep: it betrays the Korean people’s sense of ethnic identity and their aspiration for unification, and severely undermines the legitimacy of North Korea’s founding (which was rooted in the pursuit of unification and national liberation). This has also caused the pro-North faction in the South to shrink significantly.
Kim Jong-un’s actions are not an attempt to secure coexistence with South Korea through compromise, either. After all, he has simultaneously labeled South Korea as a "main enemy" and claimed that no means of destroying it can be ruled out. Clearly, North Korea has no intention of seeking common ground while shelving differences or living in peace with South Korea—it is instead escalating hostility.
That said, Kim Jong-un will not actually launch an all-out war, as this would threaten his own rule. All these radical moves to abandon unification are merely self-destructive: they harm North Korea’s internal cohesion and alienate South Koreans who once maintained friendly ties with the North. They do nothing to weaken South Korea—and bring only harm to North Korea.
This policy shift is also detrimental to Kim Jong-un’s rule. To this day, most people in both North and South Korea still see each other as fellow ethnic compatriots and acknowledge that unification may be possible when the time is right. In the North, in particular, for decades prior to 2023, the Workers’ Party leadership—including all three generations of the Kim family—had strongly emphasized national unification and "liberating compatriots in the South." Whether it adopted a friendly or hardline stance toward the South Korean government, it never abandoned its claim that the southern half of the peninsula is North Korean territory.
Today, Kim Jong-un’s 180-degree reversal—abandoning decades of political propaganda and denying over a thousand years of historical facts—will inevitably leave many North Koreans, including some senior Workers’ Party officials, confused, dissatisfied, and secretly opposed. While the Kim family has always relied on violence and forced indoctrination to secure obedience (rather than genuine popular support), abandoning the unification narrative and labeling southern compatriots as enemies will further erode its authority and make it even harder to command loyalty.
A major reason Kim Jong-un has taken this path is precisely his unlimited power: no one dares to voice objections or criticize his wrong ideas. He lives in an information bubble, and relying on the authority derived from violence and indoctrination, he acts on his own desires—including pursuing this self-destructive policy toward the South.
The key reason external interpretations are so often flawed is that they overlook the irrationality of Kim Jong-un and North Korea’s policies—and naively project their own emotions and assumptions onto the Korean Peninsula issue.
When judging the words and actions of North Korea’s rulers, we must be grounded in facts while accounting for the subjectivity of totalitarian leaders. We must examine motivations through the lens of interests, but we cannot stop there—we must also acknowledge the self-defeating, harmful behaviors that arise from irrationality. In the future, Kim Jong-un and North Korea will undoubtedly take more unexpected actions, and these too must be judged in a similar manner to formulate appropriate responses. |
