On August 23, Lianhe Zaobao published an article by Mr. Zhang Tiankan titled Winning Against a Stronger Enemy Is Far From Unprecedented, which contains points open to discussion.
In an interview with Fox News on August 15, Donald Trump advised Volodymyr Zelenskyy to "reach an agreement," adding, "Russia is a very powerful country, and Ukraine is not." Mr. Zhang pointed out: "Either Trump's remarks harbor hidden motives, or they are a display of naive frankness, even childish reasoning: the weak can never defeat the strong. It seems to suggest that as the weaker party facing the stronger Russia, surrender is Ukraine's best option."
Trump and his team should have a far more comprehensive and in-depth grasp of the Russia-Ukraine war than the author. The United States' projections for the war's outlook also dwarf those presented in this article. If Ukrainian forces were indeed defeating Russian troops and advancing in full force toward the Russia-Ukraine border, Trump would not have made such a proposal to Zelenskyy. Similarly, if the U.S. side predicted that Ukraine would eventually secure victory, Trump would not have offered this advice either.
It must be noted that in most cases, the weak cannot defeat the strong—even if Mr. Zhang argues that "winning against a stronger enemy is far from unprecedented." The question here is: Will Ukraine ultimately become one of the rare examples of "the weak prevailing over the strong," or will it fall into the majority category of "the weak succumbing to the strong"? Which possibility does the current battlefield situation between Russia and Ukraine favor? It is pertinent to mention Trump's remarks in an exclusive interview on December 9: "Generally speaking, at some point, the advantage of sheer size will prevail—and Russia is a country of enormous size."
Furthermore, Trump's call for Ukraine to reach an agreement with Russia as soon as possible is by no means equivalent to advocating for Ukraine's "surrender." In fact, concluding an agreement, accord, or even signing a treaty does not amount to surrender—even if the agreement, accord, or treaty involves significant concessions.
During the Hundred Years' War between England and France, the two countries signed the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360. Under the treaty, England gained sovereignty over vast territories in southwestern France—but this did not enable it to occupy these lands permanently. Around 1380, French forces had recaptured a considerable portion of the territories ceded by the treaty. By the end of the Hundred Years' War in 1453, France had recovered all its territories except the port of Calais. The Treaty of Brétigny failed to bring long-term peace between England and France, nor did it prevent the subsequent loss of the lands England had once gained.
On May 31, 1933, Xiong Bin, Chief Counselor of the Beiping Military Commission under the Nanjing Nationalist Government, and Yoshijirō Umezu, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Japanese Kwantung Army, signed the Tanggu Truce in Tanggu. The main provisions included: Chinese troops were to withdraw to areas west and south of the line connecting Yanqing, Changping, Shunyi, Tongzhou, and other locations; if Japan confirmed that Chinese troops had complied with the above provisions, Japanese forces would withdraw to the Great Wall line voluntarily. In practice, the truce recognized the Great Wall line as the "Japanese occupation line," acquiesced to Japan's invasion of the four northeastern provinces, and acknowledged eastern Hebei as a "demilitarized zone."
Regarding the reasons for signing the Tanggu Truce, Liang Zhongming wrote in The Pictorial Biography of President Chiang Kai-shek: "Since our national defense capabilities had not yet reached a level where we could resist the powerful aggressor with certainty of victory," the government "reluctantly" signed the truce on May 31 "to secure a temporary peace." The question is: Was it necessary to sign the Tanggu Truce at that time? Additionally, did it have an adverse impact on China's recovery of the northeastern provinces and eastern Hebei after Japan's surrender in 1945?
Therefore, why is Trump's call for an agreement dismissed as stemming from "naive frankness, or childish reasoning"? Does Mr. Zhang truly understand Trump's stance?
On November 2 last year, I published an article in Lianhe Zaobao titled Has the United States Made a Strategic Mistake?, pointing out: "Logically speaking, if today's United States truly has strategic foresight, and given that it regards China as its primary rival, it should consider improving relations with Russia—much like how it normalized relations with China in the 1970s to counter its main adversary, the Soviet Union. Based on such strategic considerations, the United States should have made every effort to prevent the outbreak of full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine around the turn of 2021 and 2022, but it did not genuinely strive toward that end at the time."
On November 9 of the same month, my article A Trump Victory Would Help the U.S. Correct Its Strategic Mistakes noted: "If the Russia-Ukraine war can come to an end in the near future, it should signify that U.S.-China competition has returned to the center stage of world history. All other conflicts are 'subordinate' to this globally significant rivalry—a rivalry that cannot be entirely ruled out from escalating into intense conflict at present."
The real beneficiaries of the Russia-Ukraine war are China and the United States, while the European Union and Europe should be regarded as the genuine victims. As for the United States, if it possesses long-term strategic vision, it will recognize that allowing China to benefit from this war in the long run, either directly or indirectly, is not conducive to the achievement of America's strategic goals. On the contrary, there is a certain urgency to ending the war as soon as possible and concentrating efforts on the Indo-Pacific region.
It can be argued that Trump's desire to end the Russia-Ukraine war expeditiously aligns with his global strategic objectives. While the United States could certainly continue to support Ukraine's war efforts militarily, economically, and politically, it would be difficult to predict when the Russia-Ukraine war would conclude under such circumstances. China was originally facing certain intractable economic problems, and the Russia-Ukraine war has provided it with new opportunities. Furthermore, the war has led to a "qualitative" upgrading of Russia-China relations, with cooperation deepening further in fields such as military affairs. The evolution of the China-Russia-U.S. strategic triangle has also become more favorable to China. This war has made it more difficult, rather than easier, for the United States to "counter" China.

On August 23, Lianhe Zaobao published an article by Mr. Zhang Tiankan titled Winning Against a Stronger Enemy Is Far From Unprecedented, which contains points open to discussion.
In an interview with Fox News on August 15, Donald Trump advised Volodymyr Zelenskyy to "reach an agreement," adding, "Russia is a very powerful country, and Ukraine is not." Mr. Zhang pointed out: "Either Trump's remarks harbor hidden motives, or they are a display of naive frankness, even childish reasoning: the weak can never defeat the strong. It seems to suggest that as the weaker party facing the stronger Russia, surrender is Ukraine's best option."
Trump and his team should have a far more comprehensive and in-depth grasp of the Russia-Ukraine war than the author. The United States' projections for the war's outlook also dwarf those presented in this article. If Ukrainian forces were indeed defeating Russian troops and advancing in full force toward the Russia-Ukraine border, Trump would not have made such a proposal to Zelenskyy. Similarly, if the U.S. side predicted that Ukraine would eventually secure victory, Trump would not have offered this advice either.
It must be noted that in most cases, the weak cannot defeat the strong—even if Mr. Zhang argues that "winning against a stronger enemy is far from unprecedented." The question here is: Will Ukraine ultimately become one of the rare examples of "the weak prevailing over the strong," or will it fall into the majority category of "the weak succumbing to the strong"? Which possibility does the current battlefield situation between Russia and Ukraine favor? It is pertinent to mention Trump's remarks in an exclusive interview on December 9: "Generally speaking, at some point, the advantage of sheer size will prevail—and Russia is a country of enormous size."
Furthermore, Trump's call for Ukraine to reach an agreement with Russia as soon as possible is by no means equivalent to advocating for Ukraine's "surrender." In fact, concluding an agreement, accord, or even signing a treaty does not amount to surrender—even if the agreement, accord, or treaty involves significant concessions.
During the Hundred Years' War between England and France, the two countries signed the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360. Under the treaty, England gained sovereignty over vast territories in southwestern France—but this did not enable it to occupy these lands permanently. Around 1380, French forces had recaptured a considerable portion of the territories ceded by the treaty. By the end of the Hundred Years' War in 1453, France had recovered all its territories except the port of Calais. The Treaty of Brétigny failed to bring long-term peace between England and France, nor did it prevent the subsequent loss of the lands England had once gained.
On May 31, 1933, Xiong Bin, Chief Counselor of the Beiping Military Commission under the Nanjing Nationalist Government, and Yoshijirō Umezu, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Japanese Kwantung Army, signed the Tanggu Truce in Tanggu. The main provisions included: Chinese troops were to withdraw to areas west and south of the line connecting Yanqing, Changping, Shunyi, Tongzhou, and other locations; if Japan confirmed that Chinese troops had complied with the above provisions, Japanese forces would withdraw to the Great Wall line voluntarily. In practice, the truce recognized the Great Wall line as the "Japanese occupation line," acquiesced to Japan's invasion of the four northeastern provinces, and acknowledged eastern Hebei as a "demilitarized zone."
Regarding the reasons for signing the Tanggu Truce, Liang Zhongming wrote in The Pictorial Biography of President Chiang Kai-shek: "Since our national defense capabilities had not yet reached a level where we could resist the powerful aggressor with certainty of victory," the government "reluctantly" signed the truce on May 31 "to secure a temporary peace." The question is: Was it necessary to sign the Tanggu Truce at that time? Additionally, did it have an adverse impact on China's recovery of the northeastern provinces and eastern Hebei after Japan's surrender in 1945?
Therefore, why is Trump's call for an agreement dismissed as stemming from "naive frankness, or childish reasoning"? Does Mr. Zhang truly understand Trump's stance?
On November 2 last year, I published an article in Lianhe Zaobao titled Has the United States Made a Strategic Mistake?, pointing out: "Logically speaking, if today's United States truly has strategic foresight, and given that it regards China as its primary rival, it should consider improving relations with Russia—much like how it normalized relations with China in the 1970s to counter its main adversary, the Soviet Union. Based on such strategic considerations, the United States should have made every effort to prevent the outbreak of full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine around the turn of 2021 and 2022, but it did not genuinely strive toward that end at the time."
On November 9 of the same month, my article A Trump Victory Would Help the U.S. Correct Its Strategic Mistakes noted: "If the Russia-Ukraine war can come to an end in the near future, it should signify that U.S.-China competition has returned to the center stage of world history. All other conflicts are 'subordinate' to this globally significant rivalry—a rivalry that cannot be entirely ruled out from escalating into intense conflict at present."
The real beneficiaries of the Russia-Ukraine war are China and the United States, while the European Union and Europe should be regarded as the genuine victims. As for the United States, if it possesses long-term strategic vision, it will recognize that allowing China to benefit from this war in the long run, either directly or indirectly, is not conducive to the achievement of America's strategic goals. On the contrary, there is a certain urgency to ending the war as soon as possible and concentrating efforts on the Indo-Pacific region.
It can be argued that Trump's desire to end the Russia-Ukraine war expeditiously aligns with his global strategic objectives. While the United States could certainly continue to support Ukraine's war efforts militarily, economically, and politically, it would be difficult to predict when the Russia-Ukraine war would conclude under such circumstances. China was originally facing certain intractable economic problems, and the Russia-Ukraine war has provided it with new opportunities. Furthermore, the war has led to a "qualitative" upgrading of Russia-China relations, with cooperation deepening further in fields such as military affairs. The evolution of the China-Russia-U.S. strategic triangle has also become more favorable to China. This war has made it more difficult, rather than easier, for the United States to "counter" China.